Introduction
This chapter concentrates on the counter-terrorist financing 2 measures and policies adopted in the United Kingdom. 3 The UK, unlike many other jurisdictions, has a long and established history of tackling terrorism and has implemented a wide range of legislative and policy measures. These legislative measures, which were originally enacted over a century ago, have been amended in response to the growing threat posed by international terrorism. The UK terrorist legislation was extended to include CTF provisions prior to the terrorist attacks in September 2001 4 and the introduction of the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing. 5 The first part of the chapter seeks to define the 'Financial War on Terrorism' and it then moves on to briefly comment on the UKs CTF legislation that existed before 9/11. The next part of the chapter considers the impact of the 'Financial War on Terrorism' on the UKs CTF legislation after 9/11 and it concentrates on the criminalisation of terrorist financing, the ability to freeze the assets of terrorists, the confiscation or forfeiture of terrorist assets, the implementation of the United Nations 6 sanctions regime and the use of Convention, while the second Directive introduced the use of suspicious activity reports. 13 Additionally, it is important to note the '40 Recommendations' of the Financial Action Task Force, 14 which were aimed at countering money laundering. 15 The objective of the Recommendations was to 'provide a complete set of anti-money laundering procedures which covers the relevant laws and their enforcement'. 16 It is important to emphasise that none of these measures addressed the financing of terrorism and it wasn't until 1999 that the UN approved the International Convention. 17 This Convention was introduced after a series of Presidential Executive Orders were introduced by President Bill Clinton that targeted the finances of al Qaeda following the terrorist attack on two United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 18 The International Convention criminalised the financing of terrorism; permitted the freezing, seizing or forfeiture of funds used for supporting terrorist activities and financial institutions were required to report any terrorist related SARs. 19 Prior to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 'only four States had acceded to the Convention'. 20 However, at the time of writing the International Convention has been implemented by 186 nation states. 21 The next measure was UN Security Council Resolution 1267, 22 which provides that member states are required to 'freeze [the] funds and other financial resources controlled by the Taliban'. 23 Furthermore, this UNSCR created a sanctions regime that targeted individuals and 13 Council Directive (EC) 97/2001 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering [2001] OJ 344. Hereinafter 'SARs'. 14 Hereinafter 'FATF'. 15 Financial Action Task Force, Financial Action Task Force Recommendations (2003) . 16 J Johnson, 'Is the global financial system AML/CTF prepared' (2008) 15(1) Journal of Financial Crime, (2008), 7, 8. 17 Hereinafter 'International Convention'. GA Res. 109, 9 December 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-49 (2000) . 18 Nicholas Ryder, The Financial War on Terrorism -a review of counter-terrorist financing strategies since 2001 (Routledge, 2015) 31. Hereinafter 'US'. 19 Hereinafter 'SAR'. 20 Maria O'Neill, The evolving EU counter-terrorism legal framework (Routledge, 2012) 31. 21 United Nations 'United Nations Treaty Collection -International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism', (United Nations, n/d) <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en> accessed November 11 2015. 22 Hereinafter 'UNSCR'. 23 S.C. Res. 1267, 56 th Sess., Art.4(b). entities associated with al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. This was soon followed by UNSCR 1269, which asked nation states to fully implement the UN's anti-terrorist conventions. 24 Despite this belated recognition from the UN towards the financing of terrorism, it wasn't until after 9/11 that President George Bush instigated the 'Financial War on Terrorism', which the chapter now considers.
In September 2001, President George Bush declared that 'a major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the stroke of a pen … we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network … we will starve the terrorists of funding'. 25 This declaration was followed by the publication of an action plan to tackle terrorist financing by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. 26 The response from the UN was instantaneous and controversial. 27 Terrorist financing was propelled from political obscurity and pushed towards the summit of the counter-terrorism agenda. UNSCR 1368 requires nation states to work together and target the 'sponsors' of terrorism. 28 Position, which provides that the EU will 'adopt financial sanctions … that will ensure that funds, financial assets, economic resources or other related services will not be made available to designated terrorists'. 38 The EU published a Council Regulation that imposed a series of restrictive measures that were directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism. 39 The terrorist attacks on 9/11 resulted in a fundamental alteration of policy by the international community towards the financing of terrorism. Prior to 2001, the international community hadn't considered the financing of terrorism a priority, despite the introduction of the International Convention. It wasn't until 9/11 that an overabundance of legislative measures was unanimously implemented and as a result UNSCR 1373 has become the cornerstone of the 'Financial War on Terrorism'. Therefore, the 'Financial War on Terrorism' can be defined as attacking, whether via criminalisation, confiscation, forfeiture, freezing, sanctioning the financial assets of known or suspected terrorists. Furthermore, the 'Financial War on Terrorism' also contains the use of preventative methods that have previously been used for money laundering and the collection of financial intelligence. The next section of the chapter briefly outlines the UK's CTF measures that preceded 9/11.
Counter-terrorist financing before 9/11
The two legislative pillars of the UK's counter-terrorist efforts before 9/11 were the Northern Provisions) Act 1974. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 was introduced following a Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Diplock, and the publication of his report. 44 Of relevance here was the ability of the Crown to 'seize anything which he suspects of being, has been or is intended to be used in the commission of a scheduled offence'. 45 Therefore, the Crown could seize money or assets that were intended to be used in the commission of an act of terrorism. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, which was only debated for 17 hours, was introduced within a day of the Birmingham pub bombings. 46 The 1974 Act enabled the courts to forfeit assets which were 'controlled by an individual convicted of membership, where such resources were intended for use in Northern Ireland terrorism'. 47 The next set of CTF legislative measures were heavily influenced by drug trafficking legislation. 48 For example, the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 permitted the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking offences. 49 This legislation was introduced following the 'regretful' decision of the House of Lords in R v Cuthberston, 50 and the subsequent recommendations of the Hodgson Committee. 51 The scope of confiscation regime was extended to all 'non-drug' indictable offences and specific summary offences by the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 52 Further amendments were introduced by the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 53 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995. 54 However, these were largely ineffective and the then Labour government commissioned a review of the UKs 44 HM Government, Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland (London, 1972 confiscation regime. 55 The review recommended that an Asset Confiscation Agency should be created and that both the money laundering and confiscation regime should be consolidated under one piece of legislation. These recommendations were eventually enacted via the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The drug related mechanisms also influenced the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 which criminalised contributions towards acts of terrorism, 56 contributions to resources of proscribed organisations, 57 assisting in retention or control of terrorist funds, 58 disclosure of information about terrorist funds, 59 penalties and forfeiture. 60 Furthermore, the 1989 Act 'introduced forfeiture orders in respect of terrorist funds … [which] replaced confiscation'. 61 However, the effectiveness of these provisions was questioned in a review of the UK's terrorism strategy in 1998. 62 The Home Office concluded that it had identified 'some weaknesses in the current provisions … in relation to fund-raising by international terrorist groups and their supporters'. 63 Conversely, the same report also noted that authorities had been able to successfully obtain 169 convictions in Northern Ireland under the 1989 Act and that the police had 'made it much more difficult for others, to raise money here and transfer it to those intent on using it to fund terrorist activities'. 64 However, the impact of the CTF offences in the 1989 Act has been criticised.
For example Bell noted that 'there have been no successful prosecutions for terrorist funding offences in Northern Ireland over the last 30 years and the forfeiture provisions … have never been utilised'. 65 The Home Office concluded that the scope of the existing terrorist financing provisions should be extended to include fund-raising for all terrorist purposes. As a result of the review, the Terrorism Act 2000 has become an integral part of the UK's CTF strategy. 66 The Terrorism Act defines terrorism, 67 it applies to domestic and international terrorism, 68 it maintained the concept of proscription, 69 a Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission was created, 70 new seizure and forfeiture powers were introduced 71 and financial institutions were required to detect accounts that could be relevant to terrorist investigations. 72 The criminal offences created by the Terrorism Act 2000 include fund raising; 73 use and possession; 74 funding arrangements; 75 insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands; 76 money laundering; 77 failing to disclose information about the occurrence of terrorist financing; 78 failure to disclose for the regulated sector; 79 the offence of tipping off. 80 Therefore, the UK CTF provisions permitted the seizure and forfeiture of terrorist assets and extended its money laundering reporting obligations to terrorism before 9/11. Therefore, the next part of the chapter concentrates on the impact of the 'Financial War on Terrorism' on these legislative provisions. The UK responded to 9/11 by introducing a raft of draconian and controversial counterterrorist legislation. For example, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 contained several CTF measures that permitted authorities and law enforcement agencies to forfeit terrorist cash, 81 to impose freezing orders, 82 seize terrorist cash anywhere in the UK, 83 to examine accounts that might be used to support acts of terrorism, 84 to impose restraint orders 85 and require the disclosure of information. 86 This legislation was followed the development and publication of the UKs first CTF strategy. 87 The FATF stated that the UKs CTF strategy is to deter, detect and disrupt the terrorist's financial infrastructures. 88 Additionally, the Home Office stated that the policy was aimed at limiting the ability of terrorists to move funds to and from the UK. 89 In 2007, the Labour government launched the 'Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism', which outlined how the 'public and private sectors … would deter terrorists from using the financial system'. 90 In 2010 HM Treasury reiterated the importance of 'depriving terrorists and violent extremists of the financial resources and systems', 91 which was subsequently supported by the publication the 'Strategy for Countering International Terrorism' 92 and the publication of the National Security Strategy in 2010. 93 This was accompanied by the publication of the The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 94 and the publication of CONTEST, the UK's new counter-terrorism strategy. 95 These strategy documents were followed by the introduction of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the Terrorism Prevention of Investigations Measures Act 2011, the Justice and Security Act 2013, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. What becomes clear is that UKs CTF strategy has undergone a radical period of extension following 9/11 and the next section illustrates the growing influence of the 'Financial War on Terrorism'.
Counter Terrorist Financing after

Criminalisation
The criminal offences created by the Terrorism Act 2000 include fund raising; 96 use and possession; 97 funding arrangements; 98 insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands; 99 money laundering; 100 failing to disclose information about the occurrence of terrorist financing; 101 failure to disclose for the regulated sector; 102 the offence of tipping off. 103 If a defendant is convicted of one of these offences, they are liable to a maximum term of 14 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. 104 The effectiveness of these criminal offences could be questioned because between 2000 and 2010 only 36 people have been charged with the terrorist financing offences, 105 108 It is unclear why the prosecution rate has been so low, although one reason may be because in order to prove the offences under Part III of the Terrorism Act 2000 the prosecution has to prove the terrorist element. For instance for a section 17 offence, it is necessary to prove that the defendant not only became involved in a funding arrangement but that he knew or suspected that the proceeds of the arrangement were for the purposes of terrorism. Whilst the defendant may have suspected that the arrangement was illegal in some way, it is harder to prove that the suspicion was one of actual terrorism rather than drug trafficking, human trafficking or some other crime. 109 Due to the small numbers involved, there are no sentencing guidelines for these offences and no published cases relating to sentencing practice. The only guidance, to the authors' knowledge, is contained in section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which states that if an offence has a terrorist connection, the court must treat that as an aggravating factor and sentence accordingly.
Examples of sentencing for section 15 offences include two Algerian men, Benmerzouga and
Meziane, who were sentenced in 2003 to 11 years imprisonment for raising over £200,000 for purposes of terrorism through a credit card fraud. 110 Similarly, in 2007, Hassan Mutegombwa received 10 years for inviting someone to provide money for the purposes of terrorism, 111 indicating that the judges involved thought that these two offences were serious enough to 
Asset Freezing
The UK is obliged to freeze the assets of individuals and organisations who were suspected of financing terrorism after the introduction of the UNSCR 1373. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 permits the granting of a freezing order if two conditions are fulfilled.
Firstly, HM Treasury must reasonably believe that 'action to the detriment of the United Kingdom's economy (or part of it) has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons' 113 and 'action constituting a threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of the UK or residents of the UK has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons'. 114 The second condition is where 'one person is believed to have taken or to be likely to take the action the second condition is that the person is (a) the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or (b) a resident of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom'. 115 Once a freezing order has been made it prevents all persons in the UK from making funds available to, or for the benefit of, a person or persons specified in the order. 116 Nonetheless, the former Labour government highlighted the apparent success of asset freezing and boldly stated that prior to 9/11 they have frozen the assets of over 100 entities and approximately 200 individuals totalling in excess of £100m. 123 It has also been suggested that 'asset freezes can have a deterrent and disruptive effect, and the fact that such effect is unquantifiable does not mean that it is trivial … designation of a known terrorist organisation with a history of fundraising … may be assumed to have useful disruptive effects'. 124 Conversely, it has crudely been suggested that success can be measured in the 115 actual amount of money frozen 'and though the headline figure thus generated is doubtless politically satisfying to some, it is not a measure of effectiveness'. 125 Nonetheless, despite the 'media friendly' figures flaunted by the government, the amount of money frozen has drastically fallen. For example, it was reported in 2011 that the amount of assets frozen was £100,000, 126 £44,000 in 2012, 127 £102,000 in 2013 128 and £61,000 in 2014. 129 The House of Lord Select Committee on Economic Affairs stated that 'the evidence suggests that the amounts of money frozen are so small, both in absolute terms and relative to the probable resources of the targets, that it is doubtful whether asset freezes are effective as a means of inhibiting or changing the behaviour of those who are targeted'. 130 This is a view supported by Brent and Blair who stated that 'as far as the UK is concerned, the result of the imposition of sanctions regimes against Al Qaida and the Taliban has been to freeze £466,000 with 187 frozen bank accounts … in the case of anti-terrorist sanctions, their effectiveness … has been the subject of'. 131 Therefore, it has been concluded that the freezing asset provisions are 'an 
Confiscation/Forfeiture
The ability of law enforcement agencies to confiscate the assets or profits of acts of terrorism is permitted by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Terrorism Act 2000. A criminal confiscation order is imposed against a convicted defendant to pay the amount of the benefit from crime. In order to grant a confiscation order, the court must consider two questions. 143 Firstly, whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle? 144 Secondly, has the defendant profited from their illegal behaviour? 145 A defendant is regarded to have had a 'criminal lifestyle' if one of the following three requirements are met, and there has to be a minimum benefit of £5,000 for the final two to be met. Firstly, it is a 'lifestyle offence' as specified in 154 and intellectual property offences. 155 The second condition, 'course of criminal conduct', is a part of a criminal activity in two cases. The first case is where the defendant has benefited from the conduct and '(a) in the proceedings in which he was convicted he was convicted or three or more other offences, each of the three or more of them constituting conduct which he has benefited'. 156 The second instance is '(b) in the period of six years ending with the day when those proceedings were started he was convicted on at least two separate occasions of an offence constituting conduct from which he has benefited'. 157 Once the court feels that this criterion has been met, it will determine a 'recoverable amount' and grant a confiscation order that compels the defendant to pay. 158 The scope of the UKs regime was extended to include the forfeiture of terrorist cash at its borders. 159 The Terrorism Act 2000 permits forfeiture provided a person is convicted of one of the terrorist property offences as outlined above. 160 These forfeiture provisions were extended to the seizure of terrorist cash anywhere in the UK. 161 These powers have been used, but the amount of money forfeited is small when compared with other types of criminal activity-only £1.452m was forfeited between 2001 and 2006. 162 The Home Office reported that between 2008 and 2009 £838,539.65 was forfeited. It is important to note that there are some problems with the collection of any accurate data for the amount of terrorist cash forfeited. 163 This part of the 'Financial War on Terrorism' has had minimal impact on the ability of UK authorities to confiscation the proceeds of directing terrorism as these powers already existed. However, the model that has been adopted by the 'Financial War on Terrorism' is geared towards tackling the proceeds of crime for organised criminals, drug cartels and other criminal offences is inappropriate for terrorism. This is due to the fact that terrorists do not seek to profit from their illegal activity. An example of this approach is 'reverse money laundering', which involves terrorists receiving clean money from misapplied charitable donations for example that then becomes illegal money when it is used for the purposes of a terrorist attack.
The Sanctions Regime
One of the most important and controversial parts of the 'Financial War on Terrorism' has been the expansion of the UNs sanctions regime, the legal origins of which can be found in Treasury additional power to impose financial restrictions on 'a country of concern' in response to threats to the UK or where the FATF has advised that appropriate measures should be undertaken. The sanctions regime has attracted a great deal of criticism. For example, it has been suggested that banks have been unfairly targeted by the sanctions regime due to a significant increase in compliance costs. 167 The British Bankers Association 168 questioned the appropriateness of the use of sanctions and stated:
'One of the major clearers estimated its direct staff costs associated with sanctions work as nearly £300,000 in 2004 but total systems costs exceeded £8m. The time of counter staff dealing with actual/potential customers affected by sanctions was not costed. In general terms, the large retail banks will be spending £10m per institution on systems and millions per year in running/staff costs'. 169 Additionally, Anderson stated that despite banks supporting the sanctions regime they are required to 'operate highly elaborate control structures, because of what is perceived as the huge reputational and regulatory risk of being seen to assist in the financing of terrorism. As one [banker] put it to me, even an inadvertent association with the funding of an incident such as 7/7 could bring down a whole bank'. 170 Additionally, BBA asserted that 'many banks have to screen millions of transactions per month in order to comply with the various sanctions regimes, and drew my attention also to uncertainties and ambiguities over the systems and controls that banks are expected'. 171 However, this point must be treated with an element of caution as banks have a proven track record of complaining about an increase in compliance costs associated with meeting their anti-money laundering reporting obligations. 167 Brent and Blair (131). 168 Hereinafter 'BBA'. 169 House of Lords Select Committee (130) 116. 170 Anderson (119) 61. 171 Ibid.
Indeed, Haines took the view that 'Banks and financial intermediaries may argue that the costs of compliance with various country sanctions lists are insignificant compared with the loss of reputation and integrity: assets to which such organisations cannot attach a price tag'. 172
Financial Intelligence
The UK has a long history of imposing reporting requirements on financial institutions where there is a risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. For example, the first money acts of terrorism. 174 An individual or organisation who suspects that an offence has been committed under the Terrorism Act 2000 is legally required to complete a SAR, which is then sent via a Money Laundering Reporting Officer to the NCA for processing, who will determine whether or not to pass the information on to the police for further investigation.
There are a number of other weaknesses that are associated with the reporting of suspicious transactions and the financing of terrorism. For example, one of the most commonly referred to faults has been the unsatisfactory approach adopted by the courts toward the definition of 172 J Haines, 'Embargoes and economic sanctions: does the hand fit the glove? ' (2006) the term 'suspicion'. 175 Some guidance has been offered by the courts under the money laundering reporting obligations imposed by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. For example, in the case of R v. Da Silva, the court stated that 'it seems to us that the essential element of the word suspect and its affiliates, in this context, is that the defendant must think that there is a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling of unease would not suffice'. 176 Goldby noted that the interpretation of suspicion in Da Silva was followed by the Court of Appeal in K v National Westminster Bank. 177 Further guidance on the interpretation of suspicious activity is offered by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group who stated that:
'Suspicion has been defined by the courts as being beyond mere speculation and based on some foundation, for example 'a degree of satisfaction and not necessarily amounting to belief but at least extending beyond speculation as to whether an event has occurred or not'; and 'although the creation of suspicion requires a lesser factual basis than the creation of a belief, it must nonetheless be built upon some foundation'. 178 Another frequently cited criticism of the reporting obligations is that they have created a 'fear factor' among the regulated sector which has seen a dramatic increase in the number of SARs submitted to financial intelligence units across the world. 179 For example, it has been reported that between 1995 and 2002 the number of SARs submitted to the UK's FIU increased from 5,000 to 60,000. 180 More recently, it has been reported that the UK FIU received 210,524 SARs in 2008, 181 in 2010 it received 240,582 SARs, 182 in 2011 the figure increased to 247,601, 183 in 2012 the figure was 278,665 184 and in 2013 the figure was 316,527. 185 The number of suspected instances of terrorist financing in 2013 numbered 856
SARs, an increase of 23% from 2012, representing 0.27% of the total number of submitted SARs to the NCA. 186 In 2014, the NCA reported that it received 354,186 SARs and 1,342 were distributed to the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit, representing approximately a 57% increase. 187 In addition to the traditional means of gathering financial intelligence via the use of SARs, the Terrorism Act 2000 contained a number of statutory measures that related to financial information orders. For example, the Terrorism Act 2000 permits the use of orders that require a financial institution to provide customer information if it is related to a terrorist investigation. 188 An application for an order can be made by a police officer that could 'require a financial institution [to which the order applies] to provide customer information for the purposes of the investigation'. 189 The order could apply to '(a) all financial institutions, (b) a particular description, or particular descriptions, of financial institutions, or (c) a particular financial institution or particular financial institutions'. 190 If a financial institution fails to comply with the financial information order it is guilty of a criminal offence. 191 However, the financial institution does have a defence to breaching the financial information order if they can illustrate that either the 'information required was not in the institution's possession, or (b) that it was not reasonably practicable for the institution to comply with the requirement'. 192 Binning noted that financial information orders are 'available for general criminal money laundering and criminal benefit investigations under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. They are also available for use in mutual assistance requests to enable information to be passed to overseas investigators without the knowledge of the account holder'. 193 Additionally, the Terrorism Act 2000 permits the use of account monitoring orders. 194 Leong stated that an account monitoring order 'is an order that the financial institution specified in the application for the order must, for the period stated in the order, provide account information of the description specified in the order to an appropriate officer in the manner, and at or by the time or times, stated in the order'. 195 Account monitoring orders have been described as draconian 196 and their relationship with civil liberties has been questioned on several occasions. An account monitoring order can be granted by a judge if they are satisfied that '(a) the order is sought for the purposes of a terrorist investigation, (b) the tracing of terrorist property is desirable for the purposes of the investigation, and (c) the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation'. 197 Where an application is made for account monitoring, the order must contain information relating to accounts of the person who is subject to the order. 198 One of the most controversial pieces of CTF legislation is the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
The Act 'has added to those financial provisions in significant ways. The Act implements a new regime of financial directions in Schedule 7 … the scheme is very wide-ranging in application and effect'. 199 Schedule 7 of the 2008 Act provides HM Treasury with the ability to give a direction where the FATF has requested actions to be pursued against a country due the risk it presents of terrorist financing or money laundering. 200 Furthermore, HM Treasury is permitted to impose an action is they reasonably believe that a country poses a significant 
Conclusion
'There has been an increase in activity to counter the financing of terrorist activity since the events of 9/11. Despite a host of regulations having been introduced, identifying terrorist financing is still an area of limited success '. 202 The UK has adopted a very robust CTF policy and has made every effort to implement the 'Financial War on Terrorism'. Originally, the UKs CTF measures were aimed at tackling domestic and not international terrorism. These provisions permitted the seizure and forfeiture of items that had or were intended to be used for the purposes of supporting or committing acts of terrorism. However, these provisions were deemed ineffective and were replaced by the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 following the terrorist attacks in September 2001. These two legislative measures expanded the criminalisation of terrorist financing, required reporting entities to submit SARs, permitted the freezing of terrorist assets and complied with the UN sanctions regime.
However, this chapter has presented evidence that questions the effectiveness of the implementation of the 'Financial War on Terrorism' in the UK. For example, since the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the extension of the criminalisation of terrorist financing there has not been a steady increase in the number of prosecutions or convictions.
Furthermore, the ability of HM Treasury to freeze the assets of terrorists was dealt a significant blow following the decision of the Supreme Court in A v HM Treasury.
Furthermore, it is also noted that the amount of suspected terrorist money that has been frozen since 9/11 has significantly reduced since the initial inroads announced by the Labour government in 2000. The effectiveness of the UKs stance toward the financing of terrorism has also been limited by political infighting within the Coalition and current Conservative government over the creation of a single Economic Crime Agency. 203 This was proposed by Fisher and was subsequently adopted by the Coalition government as part of their Coalition agreement. 204 However, the idea was rejected by the Home Secretary, Teresa May MP, who opted to prioritise the creation of the NCA following the enactment of the Courts and Crime Act 2013. The role of the NCA is divided into four 'Commands', one of which tackles 'Economic Crime'. This disjointed approach towards establishing a single ECA that exclusively deals with all aspects of financial crime has adversely affected the ability of the UK to tackle the financing of terrorism. For example, the Home Affairs Select Committee stated that the effectiveness of the UK's CTF strategy is also adversely affected by 'the fact that in the UK, the responsibility for countering terrorism finance is spread across a number of departmental departments and agencies with no department in charge of overseeing the policy'. 205 This was supported by Anderson who noted 'the fact that asset-freezing is administered by a different department from other counter-terrorism powers means however that extra effort may be required if asset-freezing is always to be considered as an alternative to or in conjunction with other possible disposals for those believed to be engaged in terrorism'. 206 However, the largest threat to the effectiveness of the UK CTFs strategies and
